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Introduction
The September 11 terrorist attacks were one of the most mediated events 
in history. They targeted the heart of a major Western megalopolis that is a 
global economic, cultural, and media centre. Images of destruction, shock, 
and suffering were displayed on TV screens and newspapers’ front pages 
for a very long time. It was a major media spectacle in modern history that 
“unfolded in a city that was one of the most media-saturated in the world and 
that played out a deadly drama live on television” (Kellner, 2004, p. 43).One 
of the major consequences of this media coverage is that it brought Muslims 
and Islam to the fore in western societies. Akbar (2001) aptly maintains that 
“the terrible and tragic events of September 11 have opened a Pandora’s box 
of questions about Islam.”
In Britain, for instance, many issues such as religious fundamentalism, terror-
ism, and the status of multiculturalism in society have gained unprecedented 
attention in the media after these attacks. 
Mercer (cited in Hall, 1992, p. 275) argues that “identity only becomes an 
issue when it is in crisis.” Indeed, as the media and popular attention to 
Muslims and Islam-related issues increased dramatically, Muslim diasporas 
in the West have found themselves under immense pressures to defend their 
culture, faith and identity while proving their loyalty to their host countries. 
This experience has been only heightened and inflated by the global flows of 
ideas, images, and discourses made possible by transnational media such as 
satellite channels, which certainly affect how Muslim diasporas interpret their 
everyday life, their experience as well as their status in society. This situation 
begs three main questions: How can we better conceptualize and understand 
the notion of Muslim Identity? To what extent media coverage of 9/11 has 
affected Muslim diasporas’ identity building? And, finally, what implications 





Stream 4 (1) • Ben Moussa: Global and Local Media Dynamics • 3
British Muslims  
A Brief Historical Background
Although Muslims started to settle down in Britain as early as in 1860s, 
large-scale immigration to the country was the “result of post- Second World 
War reconstruction and the eventual long boom, coinciding with the decolo-
nization of the British Empire” (Poynting & Mason, 2007, p. 3). The notions 
of ‘Muslim community’ and ‘Muslim identity’ are, however, relatively recent 
ones as they emerged distinctively only in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Before that, Muslims were usually perceived within ethnic categories in as 
much as “ethnic identifications […] rather than religion were recognised in 
society as the key signifiers of individual and collective difference” (An-
sari, 2003, p. 9). This explains why demographic statics on British Muslims 
became available only in 2001 after a question on religion was added to the 
2001 census in the United Kingdom (Abbas, 2004, p. 27). Moreover, al-
though dominant discourses paint British Muslims as a largely homogeneous 
community, Muslim communities in the country come from diverse ethnic 
origins and historical backgrounds that have shaped their experiences as 
minority groups. This diversity is bound to affect the way different Muslim 
groups interpret, practice and link religion to their daily life (Mandeville, 
2001; 2003). 
Emergence of Muslim Identity
Most commentators agree that the emergence of a ‘Muslim’ community 
proclaiming a shared identity dates back to the early 1980s due to various 
events such as the rise of populist English nationalism and the New Right 
movement, the Rushdie affair,1 and, later on, the 1991 Gulf war. But the no-
tion of ‘Muslim identity’ has been generally opposed from the start by the 
White majority and the media (Richardson, 2002). Muslim identity has been 
perceived as a threat to the existing system because it was perceived as a 
“politicised religious identity” (Modood, 2000, p. 51) that contradicts British 
traditional values (Poole, 2002). In fact, compared with other ethnic minori-
ties in Britain, Muslims have been considered as an “alien minority, with so-
cial and cultural values and beliefs systems diametrically opposed to those of 
the west” (Khan, 2000, p. 31). While this perception feeds on contemporary 
experience of Muslims in Britain as immigrants and an ‘alien’ minority, it is 
also rooted in a long history of rivalries and colonization in the relation be-
tween the Islamic world and the Christian West (Said, 1978; 1997). As Abbas 
(2004, p. 29) points out, “just as present-day Islamophobia relies on history 
to fill in the substance of its stereotypes, the contemporary fear of Muslims 
has its own idiosyncratic features connecting it with the more recent experi-
1. In 1988, Salman 
Rushdie, a British 
citizen of Indian ori-
gin, published Satanic 
Verses, a novel that 
caused much contro-
versy in many Islamic 
countries and the 
Muslim community in 
the UK because it was 
perceived to contain 
irreverent depiction of 
Prophet Mohammed.  
The controversy led 
Imam Khomeini, Iran’s 
leader at the time, to 
call for the killing of 
Rushdie. As a result, 
Rushdie was forced 
to live under police 
protection for several 
years.
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ences of colonialism, decolonization, immigration, and racism”. 
Media and Public Perception of British Muslims
Numerous research studies have found that the representation of Muslims 
in mainstream media is predominantly a negative one (Richardson, 2002; 
Whitaker, 2002). A research study that surveyed the British newspapers 
between 1993 and 1997, for instance, found that these newspapers predomi-
nantly ignored covering British Muslims’ life and culture, and that when they 
did, the coverage was predominantly negative (Richardson, 2002, p. 228). 
Richardson (p. 226), thus, concludes that Muslims are excluded, first, from 
“the position of ‘Britishness’ they are perceived to lack; and second, Muslims 
are excluded from the position of ‘Britishness’ by virtue of the ‘Islamicness’ 
that they are perceived to have.” The Runnymede trust2 committee report 
(1997) concluded that Islamophobia was a rampant phenomenon in the UK 
society and associated it with the spread of xenophobia. The report summa-
rized anti-Muslim discourse in society and in the media into eight points:
1. Islam seen as a single monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to 
new realities. 
2. Islam seen as separate and other – (a) not having any aims or val-
ues in common with other cultures (b) not affected by them (c) not 
influencing them.
3. Islam seen as inferior to the West – barbaric, irrational, primitive, 
sexist.
4. Islam seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of ter-
rorism, engaged in ‘a clash of civilisations’. 
5. Islam seen as a political ideology, used for political or military 
advantage.
6. Criticisms made by Islam of ‘the West’ rejected out of hand. 
7. Hostility towards Islam used to justify discriminatory practices to-
wards Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society.
8. Anti-Muslim hostility accepted as natural and ‘normal’ (1997, p. 
2). 
The negative attitude towards Islam and Muslims in British society is not 
limited to the symbolic field but extends to other forms of social and econom-
ic discriminations. According to a report by the European Monitoring Centre 
2. The Runnymede 
Trust, an independent 
research and social 
policy agency, estab-
lished the Commission 
on British Muslims 
and Islamophobia in 
1996. In 1997, the 
Commission produced 
a consultation paper 
entitled “Islamopho-
bia: its features and 
dangers.”
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on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) on employment in Britain, for instance, 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, who constitute the majority of the Muslim com-
munity in the country, “had unemployment rates higher than 20%, compared 
to only 6% in the broader population” (Cesari, 2009, p. 9)
British Muslim Experience After 9/11
If negative perception and representation of Muslims were widespread prior 
to September 11 terrorist attacks, the latter events constituted a landmark 
in the experience of Muslim minority in Britain as well as in the rest of the 
Western world. The EUMC reported that attacks against Muslims in the Unit-
ed Kingdom after 9/11 saw a significant rise as “incidents of violent assault, 
verbal abuse and attacks on property were noted, some of which were very 
serious” (Allen & Nielson, 2002, p. 29). Numerous studies have demonstrat-
ed that mainstream media’s coverage of Muslims-related issues shot up dra-
matically in the aftermaths and the years that followed the attacks. One study 
concluded that both broadsheet and tabloid newspapers use overtly emotional 
description of Muslims and Islam, although tabloid newspapers more fre-
quently associated the religion and its followers with terrorism (Baker, 2010). 
Baker notes that “British perceptions of Islam have been inextricably linked 
to terrorism since September 11th, 2001, with the tabloids providing a more 
emotionally visceral response” (p. 327). While Poynting and Mason (2007) 
also note an intensification of media and popular vilification of Muslims 
after 9/11, they conclude that this treatment constitutes only a continuation 
of pre-September situation: “the much-clichéd ‘Day that Changed the World’ 
in September 2001 did not actually see the world reinvented anew” (p. 16) 
as far as British Muslims’ experience is concerned. The scale and intensity 
of the backlash against Muslims prompted Abbas (2004) to claim that Mus-
lims in Britain feel that “part of the reason for their continued existence as an 
unaccepted and often despised minority is based on the presence of the ‘evil 
demon’: the media” (p. 27). To what extent, therefore, does the representation 
of diasporic Muslims by the media, especially after September 11, affect their 
identification process and the way they perceive their status as a minority in 
society? 
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Understanding Identity
Identity as a Discourse
Before considering answering the last question, it is important first to dis-
cuss the process of identity construction, both as an individual and a collec-
tive experience, and its link to media consumption. It is commonly assumed 
that identity is an innate and static characteristic of the self. Yet, as Giddens 
(1991) asserts, “self-identity is not a distinctive trait or even a collection of 
traits, possessed by the individual. It is the self as reflexively understood by 
the person in terms of her or his biography” (p. 53). Self-reflexivity is the 
outcome of the narratives people construct about themselves, and, thus, it is 
discursively constructed. Because people are always producing meanings and 
constructing discourses through language and out of their experiences, their 
identities are, thus, never complete or static, but constantly in flow and in the 
process of becoming. As argued by Stuart Hall (1996): 
Identities are about questions of using the resources of history, language, and culture 
in the process of becoming rather than being: not ‘who we are’ or ‘where we came 
from’, so much as what we become, how we have been represented and how that 
bears on how we represent ourselves (p. 4).
Yet, identity is neither wholly fluid nor open to endless reconstructions. It 
is a process “comprising both constraints and freedoms” (Melluci, 1997, p. 
65). This is because “we can alter it, but only within the constraints imposed 
by our inherited constitution” (Parekh, 2000, p. 5). Furthermore, identity is 
continually being produced within the “vectors of a similarity and difference” 
(Barker, 1999, p. 28). But while differentiation allows for the production of 
culture and meaning, it can also be “a site of danger, of negative feelings, of 
splitting, hostility and aggression towards the ‘Other’” (Hall, 1997, p. 238). 
Mass Media and Identity Construction 
Media play a central role in the formation of communities by creating an 
imagined unity among people and a sense of belonging to a community 
among them (Anderson, 1991). This role has become even more pervasive in 
late-modern society where communication and media are not only connecting 
people but are also at the heart of economic and knowledge production, thus 
permeating every level of our private and public experiences. While the me-
dia do not totally supplant our direct experience with the social and objective 
world, their importance cannot be exaggerated if we state that “the informa-
tion, images and ideas made available by the media may for most people, 
be the main source of an awareness of a shared past time (history) and of a 
present social location” (McQuail, 2000, p. 64). This is even more critical in 
Stream 4 (1) • Ben Moussa: Global and Local Media Dynamics • 7
the case of diasporic communities where media, particularly transnational 
media, connect them to their countries of origin and act as a nexus where past 
memories and life are constantly actualized and channelled into the pres-
ent and local experience, thus serving as main channels through which the 
negotiation and reproduction of identity are enacted (Christiansen, 2004; Gil-
lespie, 2002; Karim, 2003).
The Role of Transnational Media: The Case of Satellite Channels 
A key characteristic of diasporic life is the sense of division between and 
belonging to two or more countries, ‘homes,’ cultures and existential situ-
ations that reflect their dislocation, and their continual search for identity 
and fixation. Indeed, “at the heart of the notion of diaspora is the image of 
a journey […] paradoxically about settling down, about putting roots else-
where’’ (Brah, 1996, p. 182). By allowing instantaneous and quasi permanent 
interconnectedness across geographical borders and barriers, the diffusion 
of diverse types of transnational media such as satellite television in the last 
two decades has exacerbated the sense of deterritorialization and experience 
of journey among diasporas. Indeed, the transnational linkages and flows of 
images and information allowed by these new media can empower diasporic 
communities both to resist assimilation into mainstream cultures of host 
countries and, at the same time, construct alternative and hybrid identities. 
However, according to Gillespie (2006), these media can also entrench these 
communities into “world-imagining and world-making activities that cocoon 
them in ideological ghettos, preventing exposure to competing or alternative 
discourses and representations of social, political and cultural life” (p. 907). 
Diasporas living in the West have always been among the earliest and most 
savvy users of transnational media, from the smaller-scale media, such as 
the fax machines, to mass media such as the internet and satellite television. 
According to Karim (1998), for instance, diasporas were “among the earliest 
adopters of DBS [direct broadcast satellite] for cross-border transmissions - 
with its pizza-sized receiving dish installed on homes becoming the symbol 
of community self-assertion” (p. 1). This is only normal given their “hunger 
for news” (Gillespie, 2006, p. 913) and desire to remain constantly connected 
to their homelands. As far as Muslim Arab diasporas are concerned, numer-
ous studies have shown that they rely heavily on transnational news channels 
like Al-Jazeera as their main source of news (Karim, 2003; El-Nawawy & Is-
kandar, 2002; Miles, 2005; Lynch, 2006). These channels have contributed to 
the establishment and reinforcement of transnational Arab and Muslim public 
spheres where millions of audiences from the Arab world and diaspora can 
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simultaneously watch and participate in the same TV programs. Paradoxical-
ly, however, the popularity of these channels among diasporic communities 
can lead also to increasing fragmentation of national news audiences in the 
host countries (Gillespie, 2006; Karim, 2003). Thus, while the intersection 
between national and transnational public spheres in the daily life of migrant 
communities can generate spaces of dialogues between competing discourses 
and identities, it can also create divisions and tension, particularly during 
times of crisis as it is the case with September 11.
The Role of Community Institutions in the Production of Identity 
Despite their pervasive presence, mass media “do not monopolise the flow 
of information we receive, nor do they intervene in all our wider social 
relations” (McQuail 2002, p. 65). In fact, diasporas’ consumption of and 
interaction with mass media are always performed in parallel and conjunc-
tion with diverse interpersonal and mediated forms of communication, and 
their interpretation is usually “carried out in everyday conversations in the 
home, in cafes, at work with friends and family ‘here’ and ‘there’” (Gillespie, 
2006, p. 906). While Dayan (1998) maintains that it might be unproductive 
to limit the concept of diasporic media to conventional media such as the 
radio, television and print media since it is necessary to focus on “the various 
practices, institutions and organisations […] that link the different segments 
of diasporic ensembles each other” (p. 181). As far as diasporic Muslims are 
concerned, various commentators have noted the central role ethnic and re-
ligious institutions play as social and communication networks that compete 
with and in some cases supplant the role played by mass media. According to 
Rawan (2001), a mosque is among “the most important pillars of traditional 
and interpersonal communication throughout traditional Islamic society” (p. 
179). While in her study on Muslim communities in Chicago, Schmidt (2004) 
found that Muslim institutions and community organisations are “the focal 
points for community activity,” (p. 10) and play a central role in reinforc-
ing identity bonds among migrant Muslim communities, and act as networks 
of communication between them. This raises an important question on how 
these alternative forms of communication intersect with and influence the act 
of media use and consumption among British Muslims. 
Conceptual Framework
The current study draws on Castells’ (2004) interpretation of identity, par-
ticularly his distinction between three forms and origins of identity building, 
namely, “legitimizing identity,” “resistance identity,” and “project identity.” 
Legitimizing identity is “introduced by dominant institutions of society to ex-
tend and rationalize their domination vis-à-vis social actors” (Castells, 2004, 
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p. 8); resistance identities are those generated by “actors who are in posi-
tions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination, thus 
building trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles differ-
ent from or opposed to those permeating the institutions of society” (Castells, 
2004, p. 8). As for project identities, they are generated by social actors “on 
the basis of whatever cultural materials are available to them, [to] build a 
new identity that redefines their position in society and, by so doing, seek the 
transformation of overall social structure” (p. 8). Castells’ paradigm resists 
any attempt to attach identity to fixed core features while it links identifica-
tion to power relation interaction between social actors. As Castells argues, 
“from the point of view of social theory, no identity can be an essence, and 
no identity has, per se, progressive or regressive value outside its historical 
context” (p. 8). Concurring with Castells, Cerulo (1997) affirms that “the so-
cial constructionist approach to identity rejects any category that sets forward 
essential or core features as the unique property of a collective’s members” 
(p.387).
Methodology
This study relies on qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews conducted 
with members of the Muslim community in the city of Leeds, UK. In-depth 
interviewing is appropriate for the type of issues in which the researcher 
has to dig under the surface of social and cultural manifestations to discover 
“what is usually hidden from ordinary view or reflection or to penetrate to 
more reflective understandings about the nature of that experience” (Johnson, 
2002, p. 107). 
Accordingly, fifteen first-generation Arab Muslims were interviewed, the 
majority of whom were located and approached in the city’s biggest mosque, 
since it is a major community centre for Muslim community. The choice of 
first generation participants stems from the fact that, unlike South Asian Mus-
lims who came to the country after WWII, Arab diaspora is a more recent 
one and constitute mainly of first generation immigrants. The respondents are 
aged between 37 to 65 years and have all been living in Britain for periods 
of 10 to 25 years. Though the interviews covered the same issues, they were 
semi-structured, for the questions were neither structured nor worded in an 
identical way. This gave informants a great deal of freedom to engage in a 
conversation-like form of speaking, and allowed the adaptation of questions 
to the different informants who come from diverse backgrounds. The inter-
views took 60 to 90 minutes, were tape-recorded and conducted in diverse 
locations in the city of Leeds in the UK. The researcher informed the partici-
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pants about the objective of the interviews and they all provided their consent 
on taping the interviews and publishing the transcripts. 
To code and analyze the data, a qualitative method was employed, namely 
open coding. According to this method, “events/actions/interactions are 
compared with others for similarities and differences. They are also given 
conceptual labels. In this way, conceptually similar events/actions/interac-
tions are grouped together to form categories and subcategories” (Corbin & 
Strauss, 1990, p. 12). 
Analysis and Discussion
The Dynamics of Media Consumption among British Arab Muslims 
As it is the case with most of the British people who ‘spend, on average, 25 
hours per week watching television’ (Livingstone, 1996, p. 305), television, 
more than any other medium, plays an important role in the life of diasporic 
Muslims, in terms of both the time spent watching it and its importance in 
the life of diasporic Muslims in general. Indeed, all informants confirmed 
that television holds a central position at home since watching it is the main 
activity they perform with their families when they gather in evenings or on 
weekends. They all indicated that the advent of transnational channels trans-
formed their viewing habits and the way they interact with media in general. 
Raed,3 a British Iraqi and self-employed engineer, said the following about 
his media use prior to the advance of satellite television:
We used to watch only BBC TV channels. There was a scarcity in news. We got news 
about the Arab World by listening to Arab radio stations on short waves, [which] did 
not have a good reputation, except the Arabic service in the BBC World service. We 
used to stay late in the night to listen to this channel.
Thanks to the revolution in communications technologies, Arab satel-
lite channels using Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) and, later on, digital 
technologies mushroomed after the second Gulf war in 1991 (Ayish, 2001; 
Sakr, 2001). This provided a plethora of channels to Arab Muslims living in 
Britain, the most popular of which is the famous news network Al-Jazeera. 
While the informants displayed a wide range of program preferences, they all 
agreed on the fact that news programs interest them most. As Yones, a British 
Moroccan and civil servant, points out: 
I follow the news at every hour. [We watch] mainly Arab channels. I don’t mind 
watching English ones, but they cover events like [those of] Palestine only briefly. 
Arab channels transmit the conflict in live and a vivid way […]you see events before 
your eyes. Sometimes, I watch English ones, but you can’t cover events in five min-
utes.
3. To protect the pri-
vacy of participants, 
only their pseudonyms 
are used in the current 
study.
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For Muslim Arab audiences, news about Arab and Islamic countries holds 
priority in their daily media consumption habits. However, diasporic Arab 
Muslims do not constitute a homogeneous audience or media consumers, in 
general. The data generated by the informants’ testimonies shows that there is 
a wide spectrum of diversity at the level of media choices and television con-
sumption habits. At the far end of the spectrum, some respondents indicated 
that they hardly watched local channels because the latter broadcast programs 
that contain sexual content that they found too licentious and against their 
religious and moral convictions. Speaking about his preferences, Hisham, a 
British Iraqi teacher, points out:
At home we watch only Arab channels. […]. We watch mainly news programs on Al-
Jazeera, and religious programs on Al-Manar and Eqra’a channels.4 We don’t watch 
English channels. Their channels are immoral. They show immoral things even in ads 
to promote goods. It is acceptable for them, but not for us. I fear about our children, 
and so we don’t switch to [these channels]. 
Hisham’s case illustrates clearly the role of satellite channels in isolating 
some diaspora members from the rest of society, especially in terms of shar-
ing national news and mediated public spheres. It also reflects the dialectic 
between the private and public spheres in the experience of diasporas. In fact, 
the house plays a central role in the life of diasporic communities because it 
often becomes a substitute and proxy for the home country. The reproduction 
of the home land takes place through various practices and objects such as 
furniture and decoration, food, organization, and sharing of space, use of lan-
guage, and gender relationship, among many others. While watching satellite 
channels contribute to this process of “home” reproduction, local channels’ 
programs can create tension by infringing on acceptable “decent” behaviour. 
Zokaie and Philips (2000) note that the “interaction between western values 
and Islamic values is often seen [by British Muslims] as potentially disrup-
tive and as something which requires constant vigilance by the parents to 
keep their children in control” (p. 49). It is worth noting how Hicham frames 
the issue through “our” vs. “their” channels, illustrating how media consump-
tion and choices play an active role in the reinforcement of “othering” and 
production of identity. Refusal to watch “their” channel becomes an act of 
resistance against cultural assimilation and at the same time a tool of self-
essentialization and reification of identity.  
At the other end of the spectrum, another informant declared that he watched 
Arab channels only for a very short time each day. Because he is married to a 
British woman of Pakistani origin, and his children have grown up in Britain, 
Raed says:
I am the only person at home who knows Arabic very well, and I don’t want to 
impose my choices on the other members of the family […] so normally I contend by 
4. These two chan-
nels mainly broadcast 
religious programs.
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watching only one news hour on Al-Jazeera. The remaining time we watch English 
channels… 
Raed’s case is that of multilingual and multiethnic households where media 
consumption and preferences are characterized by negotiations and compro-
mises between family members. This process is further complicated by the 
fact that the parents are linked to separate “home” countries, which is bound 
to shape TV watching habits and experiences. Negotiating and finding com-
promises on sharing TV experiences quickly become lifelong habits and part 
of diasporic communities’ everyday endeavours to reconstruct their life out 
of articulations between different temporal, geographic, psychological, and 
hermeneutic processes and experiences.  
Some informants declared that, though they prefer to watch Arab chan-
nels, they also like to watch local ones because the latter provide them with 
programs that most benefit them in their daily life. Thus, Anas, a Moroccan 
restaurant-owner, indicated that he followed regularly Ramsey’s Kitchen 
Nightmares’ program on Channel 4 because he learns from it how to enhance 
the profile of his restaurant. Accordingly, though they are widely watched 
and in most cases preferred over other media outlets, transnational channels 
do supplant local media and the role of the latter in the daily life of diasporic 
Muslims. Muslim Arab diaspora members are enmeshed in multilevel rela-
tionships and networks at the local level, and therefore consumption of Brit-
ish media is part of their everyday life and participation in their communities. 
While members of Muslim Arab diasporas may share certain media con-
sumption habits, they differ in how they interpret and deal with media con-
tent itself. In fact, though the majority of respondents expressed a preference 
for Arabic Satellite news channels such as Al-Jazeera, many of them indicat-
ed that they do not blindly trust these channels. Hisham, for instance, stated 
that he does not trust all that Arab channels say about Iraq. According to him, 
Arab channels sometimes, 
Practice propaganda and look for sensationalism when they report news about bomb-
ings in Baghdad […]. They seek to attract audiences and I don’t like it. I call my 
relatives there and they are not even aware of these bombings. 
Likewise, commenting on the way she interprets both local and transnational 
media, Rajaa, a British Egyptian medical consultant, says:
When I want to know about something, I check the Guardian, the BBC and, of 
course, Al-Jazeera. But I trust Al-Jazeera more. I think they give complementary 
view… but when I read in the Guardian about Palestine I can’t help reading it criti-
cally and see how they present news, but when I see Al-Jazeera, it’s not the same. 
Alicia Horton
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It’s not a thing I do consciously, but when I think of it now, I realize it. I cannot help 
analysing why [English media] say this or that.
The latter testimonies reflect how mass media cannot monopolise truth in an 
age where audiences can always check the veracity of news through alterna-
tive communication technologies, such as the telephone and the Internet, and 
by comparing one media outlet to another. They also reveal how audience 
members are active readers of media texts, and that they can become produc-
ers of news, using mediated and non-mediated forms of communication to 
check, recreate, and communicate information, commentary, and interpre-
tations to neighbours, relatives, and friends. The notion of the active audi-
ence should not be limited to the sense of “resistant” readers who are able to 
counter-interpret media messages. As Livingstone (1998) argues, the notion 
of resistance depends “not so much on the interpretative process but on the 
relation between the textual and extra-textual resources drawn upon during 
making sense of television” (p. 189).  
Identity Formation among British Muslims 
Maxim Rodinson (Said, 1997, p. 57-58) distinguished between three levels 
of reference to Islam: the first level is the teachings contained in the sacred 
texts, mainly the Qur’an; the second consists of the various and conflicting 
interpretations of these texts; the third, refers to the way in which various 
ideologies have been lived and put to practice. Said even adds a fourth level, 
that of the connotations the term “Islam” evokes when used or referred to in 
the West. These four layers of reference inform and shape in a verity of ways 
how Arab Muslims perceive their identity and experience in Britain.   
While the small sample of respondents used to generate the data for the cur-
rent study cannot be claimed to be representative of Arab Muslim diaspora 
in Britain, they yielded, nonetheless, some interesting correlations between 
respondents’ media consumption habits and the way they perceive their own 
identity. Those respondents who watch exclusively Arab transnational chan-
nels are the ones who emphasised most of their affiliations to their country of 
origin and religion over any other types of belonging. Commenting on what 
it means to him to be a Muslim living in Britain for the last 20 years, Rashid 
argues: 
I’m a Muslim, I’m an Iraqi, too […] Iraq was the place where I grew up […] but I 
feel I’m more of a Muslim than an Iraqi. Islam sets us a clear path to follow. It pro-
tects us from being totally dissolved within the British society. 
First generation immigrants such as Arab Muslims diaspora maintain in gen-
eral strong ties with their home countries, and these links have been further 
Spot available at http://
www.axe.ca/main.
html#en-section-player.
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reinforced by transnational media. In the words of Karim (2003), “home-
land politics form a major topic for the media of some diasporas, especially 
those consisting largely of first-generation migrants” (p. 3). But as Rashid 
indicates, this form of affiliation competes with religious identity that may 
sometimes take precedence over the first one. The sense of identification with 
a Muslim community, both at the local and global levels, rather than with an 
ethnic group or country of origin is the outcome of a slow process of deter-
ritorialization and a transformation Muslim diaspora members go through in 
the process of rebuilding new lives in their new home country. 
Other informants affirmed they viewed the Muslim identity as categorically 
opposed to the British one on moral grounds. Arguing about the dangers of 
living within a different cultural and social context compared to the one of 
his native country, Said, a British self-employed Algerian, points out:
It’d be better if you want to keep your identity and origins not to integrate too much 
with [the British], because you will then lose your religion […]. They believe in 
individual freedom. A man from us cannot do whatever he likes except according to 
the precepts of God. 
Said’s last statement, on the one hand, reflects a clear essentialist perception 
of identity since it reduces the “Muslim” identity to a few moral guidelines 
and religious precepts, while it views the “English” identity as diametrically 
opposed to and uncompromisingly different from the “Muslim” one. On the 
other hand, self-essentialization is a common discursive product of “dias-
pora consciousness [that] lives loss and hope as a defining tension” (Clifford, 
1994, p. 312). Highlighting one’s difference from the other is a defensive 
reaction against territorial up-rootedness and an expression of defiance in the 
face of negative perception of Muslim communities in society. 
However, not all informants stated that religion is their primary source of 
identification. Anas, a British Moroccan accountant, for instance, asserted 
that though he is a Muslim, he feels his identity as a Moroccan and Maghre-
bian takes precedence over other sources of identification:
I’m Moroccan first. Moroccan culture is deeply rooted in me. When I meet other 
Muslims I feel they look at me first as a Moroccan. It’s in their subconscious, and 
mine. My first adherence is to Morocco.  
Indeed, despite the importance of religion, it is far from being the sole vari-
able shaping British Muslim identity because ethnic, national, regional and 
class variables may strongly compete with religious identity and sometimes 
eclipse it. Besides, the boundaries of identity are never clearly marked neither 
complete as they are constantly redefined. Commenting on how his expe-
rience in diaspora enabled him to rediscover his affiliation to a Pan-Arab 
cultural background, Anas says: 
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When I came to Britain, I had a different perception of Arabs from the Middle East 
and the Gulf […] I felt I had no connection with them. I didn’t even want to know 
them. I used to go out with the Spanish, the French, and the Italians. I felt closer to 
them. It is only later that I realized that I also shared many other things with them 
[Arabs from the Middle East].
Anas’s experience reveals how being a Muslim is not something innately 
defined in all its contours prior to individual experience; it is a mixture of 
cultural heritage, collective experience and individual personality and biogra-
phy. It also shows how diasporic experience is a constant search for stability 
and fixation, which is typical of diasporic communities who are “constantly 
producing themselves anew, through transformation and difference” (Hall, 
1993, p. 402). While Anas’ journey led him to rediscover new connections 
and sources of identification, Rajaa, on the other hand, affirms that being 
a Muslim does not necessarily entail that she can equally identify with all 
members of British Muslim communities. Describing how she perceives non-
Arab Muslims, mainly South-Asian women, Rajaa points out:
When I see a Pakistani woman, I think she is a Muslim woman. I don’t think I share 
with her many cultural aspects, though her religion is same as mine. There is some-
thing that unites us, but it’s different when I think of somebody from Iraq, or Saudi 
Arabia. I feel closer to them.  
Thus, respondents’ narratives above sheds light on the heterogeneity char-
acterizing the way British Muslims, particularly first generation Arab immi-
grants, perceive their identity. The terms “Muslims” and a “Muslim identity” 
are generic ones that encompass multiple and interrelated forms of affilia-
tions, as well as modes of living and interpretations of religion that inform 
how British Muslims identify themselves as individuals and members of 
Muslim communities at the local and global levels. A similar complexity also 
characterizes British Muslims’ interaction with and consumption of both lo-
cal and transnational media. Moreover, while the data confirmed the central-
ity of transnational media in the life of British Arab Muslims and their role in 
identity formation among this community, it also illustrated that the impact 
of transnational media is not uniform, and does not necessarily increase the 
isolation of Muslim diasporas. In fact, British Muslims’ interaction with 
media and their identity discourses are characterized by important varia-
tions, as the discussions above have demonstrated. Paradoxically, however, 
such heterogeneity is contrasted by a quasi-homogeneous perception among 
Muslim diaspora of the negative role British media play in representing them 
as a community. 
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Media Role and Identity Construction among British Muslims after 9/11 
As mentioned earlier, though media representation of the ‘Muslim identity’ in 
Britain has always been predominantly negative, the intensity of such per-
ception significantly augments during time of crises and major events at the 
national and international levels. In correlation with this attention, Muslim 
diasporic communities’ consciousness about their religious identity acquires 
prominence over all other forms of affiliations. As Ansari (2003) points out, 
Islam becomes “the main or even the sole identity for many [British] Mus-
lims, particularly when they have been criticised or attacked by others on the 
basis of their religion” (p. 4-5).   
Most respondents agreed on the fact that the events of September 11 marked 
a turning point in the history of Muslims around the world, in general, and 
those living in Western countries, in particular. One of the respondents said 
that he was physically attacked in the market, while another was verbally 
abused in the street shortly after 9/11. Most of them, however, indicated that 
their main concern in the aftermath of the attacks was to avoid being spotted 
out as Muslims in the street. Yones, for example, says:
I tried to change so as not to appear as a Muslim. Before, I let my beard grow some-
times and I wore the traditional Moroccan dress […] I used to walk in the city centre 
and people came and asked me about the dress. After 9/11 I started to fear to go out 
with my wife as she wears the Hijab. We feared reaction from people who do not 
know Islam.   
Most informants who have been living in Britain for more than 20 years, 
however, asserted that though the representation of Muslims by the British 
media deteriorated after September 11, it had already become noticeably 
negative after the Rushdie affair. According to them, the current situation is a 
continuation of the past treatment of Muslims by the British media. Azzam, a 
retired British Libyan, for instance, notes:
Certainly things nose-dived in the last 3 or 4 years and the media have exploited the 
events of September 11 to stigmatise Muslims. [But] it started with the Rushdie af-
fair, which cast a very black shadow on Muslims’ image […]. It is as if it happened 
again and again. 
If the Rushdie affair and the second Gulf war propelled for the first time 
British Muslim diaspora to the front of the scene, the events of September 11 
further set them in the centre of media attention and public’s concern. While 
the coverage of Muslims-related issues by the British media has increased 
dramatically after that date, the concern of Muslims over being constantly 
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singled out has equally increased. Thus, all informants expressed that, 
though the fear of being physically targeted in public places lasted only a few 
months after the events, the concern over being profiled as Muslims and asso-
ciated with terrorism has persisted.
All informants expressed their concern about the British media’s covering of 
news and issues about Muslims in a way that associates between Islam as a 
religion and terrorism. Indeed, some informants expressed doubts about the 
practices of some media for their constant coverage of radical Islamic figures, 
Said, for instance, states that: 
[The media] don’t care about making people know Islam, but to stigmatise it. [You] 
see how they make interviews with Abu- Hamza Al-Masri.5 It’s a waste of time. It 
benefits neither Muslims nor the British.
Said’s statement was confirmed by the EUMC’s report on the backlash 
against Muslims in the UK after 9/11 that stated that a “range of voices could 
be heard in the [British] media although a disproportionate amount of cov-
erage was devoted to extremist Muslim groups and British Muslims who 
declared their willingness to join an Islamic war against the West” (Allen & 
Nielson, 2002, p. 29). Thus, Raed asserts that the current war on terrorism 
has created a favourable atmosphere for hostile discourse against Islam to 
develop in recent years:
September 11 was a golden opportunity for all those who wanted to harm Islam. Be-
fore, if they wanted to talk about it endlessly, a lot of people will be tired of it. Now, 
the constant mentioning of terrorism makes people keen at understanding more about 
those who threaten their life.
Though Raed believes there are important ethnic and cultural variations be-
tween Muslim communities, for him Muslims are unified not in what they are 
but in the way they are represented and perceived as the other:  
It doesn’t matter [for the British] really if you were an Arab, a Hindu, or an African. 
It is enough that you are different and that you are in an inferior position, and that’s 
the end of it. The relationship that binds you is that between an aboriginal citizen and 
an alien.
The possibility for Muslim diasporas to compare both British and Arab trans-
national media coverage of the war on terrorism, increases Muslims’ mistrust 
of British media’s intentions and overall performance. Comparing the British 
media coverage of the September 11 terrorist attacks and their coverage of 
the events in Palestine and Iraq, Yones says: 
The world knew about September 11 because it was covered around the clock. You 
watched buildings falling, people dying, people crying. They made interviews with 
people who lost their loved ones. For that reason people were affected. In Palestine 
5. Abu Hamza al-Masri 
is a radical religious 
cleric known for his 
provocative interpreta-
tion of Islam and inci-
tation to use violence. 
He is serving a seven 
year term in prison in 
the UK and is facing 
extradition to the US 
on terrorism charges. 
Tabloid newspapers 
often run extensive 
coverage of his actions 
and declarations, turn-
ing him into a symbol 
of “bad” Islam in 
Britain. 
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or Iraq they don’t talk to those who lost their relatives […], even when Al-Jazeera or 
Al-Arabia show pictures, they say the pictures are fake.
One direct impact of transnational media such as satellite television is that 
they have created more fusion between national and supra-national public 
spheres, which is shaping not only how diasporas experience long distance 
events, but also how they interpret domestic politics and local media repre-
sentation discourses. Moreover, although some informants declared that they 
are not practicing Muslims, they indicated that they can identify with British 
Muslims on the ground that they were all viewed by the ethnic majority and 
media as being identical. In the words of Rajaa:     
I see there is a world of differences between us […]. When I read newspapers, I feel 
closer to my people, I feel the differences, I feel they don’t understand us, and I see 
that, for them, we will always remain these inferior people with problems, just caus-
ing problems. 
In fact, as discussed earlier, the notion of ‘Muslim identity’ engulfs many 
forms of affiliation and interpretations of religion, which permit secular and 
non-practicing members of the community to consider themselves as Mus-
lims. Thus, despite being a non-practicing Muslim, Rajaa’s feeling of bitter-
ness about the way Muslims are perceived is clearly worded in a discourse 
that sets up clear boundaries between “us” (Muslims), and “they” (the media 
and white majority, as a whole). The last observation here has been con-
firmed by Robbins and Aksoy’s study (2005) that found that identification 
with Muslim community intensified dramatically among the largely secular 
Turkish diaspora in London. Thus, Rajaa’s testimony illustrates how identity 
is socially and discursively constructed through dominant power relations in 
society. Rather than being contingent on predefined sets of doctrinal believes 
and cultural components, her identity narrative is informed by an opposi-
tional discourse that seeks to challenge and resist dominant representations of 
Muslims. 
The Role of Alternative Communication: Community Centres as an Example
Mass media, both local and transnational forms, undoubtedly, play an influ-
ential and dynamic role in the way British Muslims construct their identity; 
yet, these media do not monopolise this role, neither do they determine how 
these people understand their lives and experiences. Various commentators 
have highlighted the role of ethnic media, such as newspapers, local radio 
stations, and TV stations in the life of diasporic communities (Karim, 1998; 
Husband, 2005; Alia and Bull, 2005). In comparison, the role of community 
spaces and institutions has received little attention. In fact, a number of re-
spondents declared they were members of such institutions where they share 
Stream 4 (1) • Ben Moussa: Global and Local Media Dynamics • 19
with other Muslims their experiences, organise common activities, or per-
form religious and cultural ceremonies. The mosque, however, remains the 
most important among all these forms of organised communal life. Unlike 
in many Islamic countries where the majority of mosques are used mainly 
for prayer, in Britain, mosques act as cultural and social centres that provide 
many services such as language learning, social help, and moral guidance 
for local communities, among other services. Commenting on the role of the 
Mosque for him as a Muslim, Raed notes:
For me, [the mosque] was the place that helped me to bear the feeling of estrange-
ment, and where to meet other [Muslim] people. The mosque organises activities 
during religious feasts and vacations. In addition, it is where we pray daily and can 
meet each other. When I came here, I did not know many things, and I met people [in 
the mosque] who guided me.
Most respondents also noted that the role of the mosque has been enhanced 
by the religious freedom enjoyed by Muslims in Britain. Contrary to many 
Islamic countries, mosques in Britain remain open all day, and not only at 
prayer times. Moreover, British Muslims can organise various activities in 
the mosque that enable them to rediscover their religion and question it, as 
well. Anas, for instance, claimed that he was not a practicing Muslim when 
he first came to Britain, but that he rediscovered many new things about 
Islamic culture and religion that attracted him to the religion:
In the mosque here, you have on Monday a religious sermon by Sheikh Judea. Tues-
day, you can have a lecture, the next day another activity […] you see […] you sit 
with an Imam […] who allows you to ask any question in your mind and he encour-
ages you to think and gives you freedom […] this doesn’t exist at home. They used to 
teach us only ablutions and inheritance.
Religious identity for diasporic Muslims, thus, is not necessarily something 
they bring with them from their home countries and remain static. As they 
discover new ways to define religion itself, they start to contest “what it 
means to be a Muslim, what Islam means and how it should be constructed 
and reproduced both in the West and in the rest of the world” (Werbner, 2000, 
p. 315). While dominant discourse on the Muslim identity describe it as 
closed, parochial, and anachronistic or anti-modern, Anas’ description of his 
journey that led him to rediscover religion shows that this type of identity can 
be, paradoxically, closely associated with and can be contingent upon free-
dom of choice and opinion, tolerance, and a modernist vision of religion as a 
driving force towards progress and development. 
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A Glimpse of Hope:  Towards a Project Identity? 
Even if the data generated by informants reflects a predominantly bleak ac-
count of how Muslims are represented in the British mainstream media, some 
informants, nonetheless, pointed out many positive points that mark their ex-
perience as media consumers and citizens in the country. Anas, for instance, 
confirmed that 
Channels 4 and 5 for instance show some programs that give a fair image on 
Muslims. But the English [audience] may retain one good image only to be 
destroyed in another program. They need to give more balanced programs. 
Moreover, while some respondents may feel bitter towards the way British 
media represent or exclude them, they indicated that this does not rule out 
positive interaction with the rest of society. Because of the unprecedented 
media attention Muslims got after September 11, some people started to show 
more interest in Muslims and their religion as Rashid, for instance, points 
out:
The media may not be showing reality about us. Some people might have negative 
impressions about Muslims. But when I invite some [colleagues] to my house, they 
see our hospitality, our life at home with our families. It changes the images they 
have in mind. 
Equally important, the majority of respondents indicated that British Mus-
lims themselves share a considerable part of responsibility about the way the 
media represent them. As Azzam notes:
We are giving a negative image about ourselves. We are giving them the chance to do 
it. The media are double edged and we can use them also for our advantage. You see 
younger generations who speak beautiful English, and attend TV programmes and 
discuss in full confidence and authority. 
Azzam’s comparison between the performance of the first and second gen-
erations of diasporic Muslims reflects a belief in the importance of human 
action, interpersonal communication, and interaction to resist dominant 
discourses on Muslims. Underlying his statement is a belief in human agency 
and the capacity of individuals and communities to change or at least affect 
the course of their life and experience.
Conclusions
The study has addressed the role of media, both local and translocal in shap-
ing identity construction among first generation Arab Muslim diaspora in 
Britain. It has highlighted the multiplicity characterizing the notion of “Mus-
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lim identity” that is marked by diverse and contrasting identification dynam-
ics, from reification of identity and the self, on the one hand, to non-fixity, 
fluidity and constant transformation, on the other. The paper also demon-
strated how media in general play a vital role, both as agents of inclusion and 
exclusion, in the way British Muslims construct their identity. In fact, Arab 
transnational media contribute significantly to reinforcing Arab Muslims’ 
sense of belonging to and connectedness with their countries of origin and 
with the global Muslim community. At the same time, transnational media act 
as a background against which local media are interpreted, and a discursive 
and ideological context through which daily experiences and perceptions are 
filtered. 
More importantly, while the study has pointed out the complexity of Mus-
lims’ experience and identification process in Britain, it demonstrated that the 
key unifying component in the Muslim identity is the feeling of victimhood 
and narrative of defiance vis-à-vis dominant representations and perceptions. 
Drawing on Castells’ identity model, it is possible to interpret the Muslim 
identity in Britain as a “resistance” one against the dominant or “project 
identity” of Britishness from which Muslims are excluded. The Muslim 
identity remains mainly a reactive one, since it rises to prominence and over-
rides other forms of identification during times of crisis when discrimination 
against Muslims in the media and the public sphere become highly visible. 
The continuing global war on terrorism, and overwhelming Western media 
and public sensitivity towards and prejudice against Islam and Muslims in 
general means that the notion of the Muslim identity in Britain will continue 
to be formulated and enacted more as a resistance against the “other” than as 
a reflection of homogeneous cultural features. 
As many respondents’ testimonies suggest, there are always spaces of medi-
ated and unmediated communication that open possibilities for interaction in 
society between project and resistance identities. It is true that these encoun-
ters are always underpinned by power relations, but they are nonetheless 
necessary venues through which project or hybrid identities can be produced. 
Indeed, Castells’ third category of project identities can be understood as a 
form of hybridity, where hybrid identities are born out of power relations 
and contestation. Bhabha (1996) argues that “the hybrid strategy or discourse 
opens up a space of negotiation where power is unequal but its articulation 
may be equivocal” (p. 58).
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